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PANTER v. MARSHALL FIELD & COMPANY: A TENDER
OFFER FIELD'S COULD REFUSE
In recent decisions involving corporate takeovers, the courts have
displayed much restraint in reviewing the actions of corporate directors
in their actions to resist the takeovers.' The majority of the cases have
involved a company fighting for the control of a target company. 2 The
directors of a target company have used various defensive measures to
maintain their independence. 3 While these tactics have been successful
in eliminating the takeover, they have also led to litigation. When
called upon to justify their actions, the directors have relied upon the
business judgment rule, a judicial doctrine that presumes the good faith
of the directors and shields their activities from judicial scrutiny.
4
Since the courts have generally held in favor of the directors, the direc-
tors have enjoyed freedom in exercising their control to eliminate all
attempted takeovers whether or not the best interests of the sharehold-
ers were fairly served.5
A recent example of the application of the business judgment rule
to takeover contests occurred in the United States Court of Appeals for
1. See generally Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Arsht].
2. See, e.g., Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The fight for control
may arise in two forms: a tender offer or a takeover bid. The tender offer generally refers to a
situation where an individual investor is seeking to gain control of a corporation by offering to
purchase a controlling percentage of its shares. A takeover bid refers to a situation in which a
shareholder of a corporation wishes to wrest control of the corporation away from the present
directors. For purposes of this comment, there will be no practical distinction made between a
tender offer and a takeover bid since in both situations, the corporate directors are faced with a
threat to their control of the corporation. See Note, Tender Offer Decisions.- Effect of the Business
Judgment Rule, 45 ALB. L. REV. 1122 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Tender Offer Decisions].
3. See, e.g., Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999
(1981) (controlling shareholders/directors refused loan by and stock sale to minority shareholders
to prevent control from moving to the minority shareholders). See also Cohn, Tender Offers and
the Sale of Control" An Analogue to Determine the Validity of Target Management Defensive Meas-
ures, 66 IowA L. REV. 475 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Cohn].
4. See, e.g., Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999
(1981) (Business judgment rule applied to majority shareholders/directors' refusal to sell stock to
minority shareholders who sought control of the corporation). Directors of corporations discharge
their fiduciary duties when in good faith they exercise business judgment in making decisions
regarding their corporation. When they act in good faith, they enjoy a presumption of sound
business judgment, reposed in them if any rational business purpose can be attributed to their
decisions. See Tender Offer Decisions, supra note 2, at 1125.
5. See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980) (Director of New
Jersey corporation did not breach any duties owed to the corporation or its shareholders by coun-
seling a Delaware corporation against making a tender offer for shares and then selling his shares
to the Delaware Corporation at a premium).
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the Seventh Circuit case, Panter v. Marshall Field & Company.6 The
board of directors of Field's engaged in several transactions that pre-
vented a takeover by Carter Hawley Hale,7 a California-based national
retail chain. Subsequently, several Field's shareholders sued the corpo-
ration and its directors for breach of fiduciary duty. They sought to
recover damages for their inability to tender Field's stock to Carter and
to benefit from the substantial rise in market price that had occurred as
a result of the proposed Carter tender offer. The district court8 directed
a verdict for the defendant directors at the close of the shareholders'
presentation of their evidence and on appeal the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed. The Seventh Circuit held that the Field's directors acted within
the business judgment rule and, therefore, their actions were presumed
fair.9 According to the court, the shareholders did not present sufficient
evidence to shift the burden of proof to the directors.' 0
This case comment will discuss the historical background of the
business judgment rule as well as the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of
this rule as espoused in Panter v. Marshall Field & Company." The
court's application of the rule to the actions of the Field's directors will
also be evaluated to determine whether the business judgment rule
ought to have shielded their defensive tactics from judicial scrutiny.
The analysis will focus on whether the Seventh Circuit should have
affirmed the district court's directed verdict for the directors or whether
there was sufficient evidence for the jury to decide the question of the
director's breach of fiduciary duty. This article will also discuss
whether the business judgment rule should apply at all in the corporate
takeover setting or whether, in view of another recent case,12 a different
standard should apply.
BACKGROUND OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
The business judgment rule is a judicially-created doctrine
whereby, in certain circumstances, a corporate transaction will not be
enjoined and the directors who authorized the transaction will not be
6. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 658 (1981). Marshall Field & Company
will hereinafter be referred to as "Field's."
7. Carter Hawley Hale will hereinafter be referred to as "Carter".
8. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. I11. 1980), aft'd, 646 F.2d 271
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 658 (1981).
9. 646 F.2d at 299.
10. Id.
11. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981).
12. Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294 (D.C. Del. 1981). See text accompanying
notes 173-78 infra.
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held personally liable for damages resulting from any harm. 13 The
business judgment rule requires that directors authorize only the trans-
actions that they in good faith believe are in the best interest of the
corporation.14 The rule does not apply in situations where the transac-
tion involves any self-dealing,' 5 personal interest, 16 or where the direc-
tors fail to exercise due care in ascertaining the relevant facts prior to
authorizing the transaction.17 Thus, the business judgment rule pro-
tects directors from liability for good faith mistakes when they exercise
their best business judgment in executing their corporate duties. 18
Historically, the business judgment rule developed from the judi-
cial concern that people would refuse to serve as directors if the law
held them to a higher standard of responsibility for the consequences of
their decisions. 19 The early cases recognized that people acting as di-
rectors should be held to a standard of reason, intellect, and knowledge
that is possessed by people of ordinary knowledge.20 The rule was also
designed to give directors discretion in making decisions involving cor-
porate policy without the fear of unreasonable judicial interference.
2'
The belief is that the directors, rather than the courts, are more adept in
making business decisions that maximize the shareholders' welfare.
22
The rule was also designed to aid in judicial economy by keeping the
courts from becoming deeply involved in complex corporate decision-
making.2
3
13. Arsht, supra note 1, at 111-12.
14. Id.
15. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (Business judgment rule
should not be applied where parent corporation received benefit to the exclusion and detriment of
subsidiary). Self-dealing, in this context, means any attempt by a director or controlling stock-
holder to appropriate corporate assets that are not in proportion to what the other shareholders
will receive. See Arsht, supra note 1, at 116.
16. See Petty v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140 (Del. Ch. 1975) (Business judgment rule
was not applied where directors selectively redeemed stock of preferred shareholders in order to
maintain control).
17. See Thomas v. Kempner, 398 A.2d 320 (Del. Ch. 1979) (Business judgment rule was not
applied where directors sold land for less than adequate price in spite of a higher offer). See text
accompanying notes 46-48 infra.
18. Tender Offer Decisions, supra note 2, at 1125. A directors' basic duty is to act with due
care for the benefit of the corporation and its shareholders. Id.
19. See Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829), wherein the court stated, "The con-
trary doctrine seems to us to suppose the possession, and require the exercise of perfect wisdom in
fallible human beings. No man would undertake to render service to another on such severe
conditions." Id. at 78. See also Arsht, supra note 1, at 97.
20. 8 Mart (n.s.) at 77-8. (Bank director not liable for losses resulting from defalcations by
bank's president and cashier).
21. Block and Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Actions: Viva
Zapata, 37 Bus. LAW., 27, 32 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Block and Prussin].
22. Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholder's Welfare, 36
Bus. LAW 1733, 1745 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Takeover Bids].
23. Block and Prussin, supra note 21, at 33. See also Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.S.2d 619,
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In practice, when directors make a good faith business judgment,
courts are generally reluctant to scrutinize their judgment and impose
liability for errors. 24 The business judgment rule presumes that the di-
rectors exercised their business judgment in good faith.25 Thus, the
presumption operates in favor of the directors and places the initial
burden of proof on the party attacking the directors' action. 26 For ex-
ample, in Sinclair Oil Corporation v. Levien ,27 a shareholder argued
that the directors' decision to pay excessively large dividends instead of
using the funds to expand operations was a breach of fiduciary duty.28
In applying the business judgment rule to the directors' decision, the
court refused to scrutinize the directors' judgment, unless the share-
holder proved that the payment of the dividend was not attributed to
any reasonable business objective. 29 Failing to meet the burden of
proof, the directors' decision was presumed to have been made in good
faith and thus the court found for the director.
30
In order to rebut the presumption of good faith and shift the bur-
den of proof to the directors, the plaintiff must present evidence that
the directors acted beyond the scope of the business judgment rule.
3'
Generally, evidence of self-dealing, personal interest, fraud, bad faith,
gross overreaching or abuse of discretion will be sufficient to rebut the
presumption.32 In Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc. ,33 a shareholder
sued to enjoin the sale of a Signal subsidiary to an unrelated buyer for
a price that was unreasonably lower than the property's fair value. 34
The court applied the business judgment rule and initially presumed
630, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979) ("IThe business judgment doctrine, at
least in part, is grounded in the prudent recognition that courts are ill equipped and infrequently
called on to evaluate what are and must be essentially business judgments.").
24. See text accompanying note 4-5 supra.
25. Arsht, supra note 1, at 1 I 1-12.
26. See Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980), Sinclair Oil Corp. v.
Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
27. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
28. Id. at 720-21.
29. Id. at 721-22.
30. Id. at 722.
31. Arscht, supra note 1, at 130-31.
32. See, e.g., Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 19, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (1962) (Burden shifts
when corporate funds are used to buy out an insurgent and the directors are faced with a conflict
of interest); Petty v. Permtech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140, 143 (Del. Ch. 1975) (Burden shifts after
plaintiff shows that director approved purchase in attempt to eliminate a shareholder); Condec
Corp. v. Lunkenheimer, 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769, 776-77 (1967) (Burden shifts when pri-
mary purpose of director action is to retain control).
33. 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.), af'd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974).
34. Id. at 601.
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that the directors had acted in good faith.35 However, the shareholder
presented evidence that the directors' decision to sell property valued at
$761 million for a price of $480 million constituted an abuse of discre-
tion.36 The court enjoined the transaction, holding that the evidence
was sufficient to shift the burden of proving a proper corporate purpose
to the directors.
37
The Business Judgment Rule and Fiduciary Duties
Although directors may often rely on the business judgment rule
as a defense for their good faith actions, the rule will not apply when
directors breach their duties of due care and loyalty.38 These duties are
based upon the fiduciary obligations that the directors owe to the cor-
poration and the shareholders. 39 The duties of due care and loyalty are
the standards of care by which the directors' actions must be judged.
40
Because the business judgment rule was designed to protect the direc-
tors from liability only for good faith business decisions, the rule will
not be applied to shield directors who have failed to act with due care
and loyalty with respect to the corporation.
4'
In order to fulfill their duty of due care, the directors must have
made a reasonable effort to ascertain and consider all the relevant in-
formation.42 The business judgment rule will only protect directors
from the consequences of a decision that was made with due care; that
is, a decision that was made on the basis of all relevant facts that the
directors knew or in the exercise of due care should have known.
43
35. Id. at 608-09. However, the court emphasized that the "business judgment rule [does not]
irrevocably shield the decisions of corporate directors from challenge. Id. at 609.
36. Id. at 615. See Arsht, supra note i, at 125: "What led the court to interfere was. . . a
state of facts that, if proved, would demonstrate that the value of the property being sold so far
exceeded the agreed sale price that the directors' judgment constituted an abuse of discretion."
37. 316 A.2d at 618.
38. See Arsht, supra note 1, at 119 (The duty of due care is not to be equated with the rule
itself).
39. See Guth v. Loft Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939): "Corporate officers
and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to further their private
interests. While technically not trustees, they stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and
its stockholders." See also Arsht, supra note 1, at 115.
40. See Tender Offer Decisions, supra note 2, at 1124: "As fiduciaries, directors have two
paramount obligations to the corporation and its shareholders: responsibility and loyalty."
41. See Block and Prussin, supra note 21, at 33: "The rule does not apply where the director
has in fact made no decision; for the evidence must show that affirmative acts of investigation and
decision-making took place."
42. See, e.g., Kamin v. American Express Co., 86 Misc. 2d 809, 813-14, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807,
811 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 54 N.Y.2d 651, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1976) (Board decision upheld where
finance committee minutes showed the directors considered various proposed plans).
43. See, e.g., Thomas v. Kempner, 398 A.2d 320, 323-24 (Del. Ch. 1979) (Director's refusal to
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Thus, in Casey v. Woodruff,44 a director's decision was upheld where
the finance committee minutes showed that the directors had consid-
ered various proposed plans prior to making their decision.45 However,
in Thomas v. Kempner,4 6 the court enjoined a proposed sale of corpo-
rate assets where the directors refused to consider a subsequent offer
from another party that was for a significantly higher price.47 The
court held that the directors did not act with due care because they
ignored the relevant facts of the competing offer.48 Therefore, the busi-
ness judgment rule did not apply to the directors' decision.
The business judgment rule will also not apply where the directors
breach their duty of loyalty to the corporation.4 9 The duty of loyalty
requires the directors to act with an unselfish and undivided loyalty to
the corporation in order to avoid any conflicts between their own inter-
ests and those of the corporation.50 Where the interests of the directors
and the corporation are in conflict, the directors often will act in fur-
therance of their own best interests. 5' For example, in cases where the
directors have had a material personal interest in the outcome of a
transaction or have engaged in self-dealing, the courts have applied the
test of undivided loyalty, rather than the business judgment rule.
52
Under the test of undivided loyalty, the directors have had the initial
burden of proving that the transaction served a valid business purpose
and that it was entirely fair to the shareholders. 53 Under the business
judgment rule, however, the shareholder bears the initial burden of
showing that a transaction serves no valid business purpose.
An example of the application of the test of undivided loyalty ap-
consider a better offer than the one accepted deemed a failure of due care). See text accompany-
ing notes 46-48 infra.
44. 49 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
45. Id. at 643-45.
46. 398 A.2d 320 (Del. Ch. 1979).
47. Id.
48. Id. See also Gimbel v. Signal Cos., Inc., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974), aprd, 316 A.2d
619 (Del. 1974) (Directors did not act with due care in failing to make a reasonable investigation
into the value of its subsidiary in charging a grossly inadequate sale price).
49. See generally Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) (Business judgment rule
not applied where directors breached their duty of loyalty to minority shareholders in buying out
their stock at an unfair price).
50. Guth v. Loft Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939). See also Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del.
Ch. 14, 20, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (1962) (Directors confronted with conflict of interest where they
purchased shares with corporate funds to remove a perceived threat to corporate policy).
51. See id. See also Tender Offer Decisions, supra note 2, at 1123 (When directors are faced
with a conflict of interest, they often will consider their own interests as opposed to the fiduciary
responsibilities which they owe to the corporation and its shareholders).
52. See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
53. Tender Offer Decisions, supra note 2, at 1128.
1156
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peared in the case of Singer v. Magnavox Company.54 The directors
and majority shareholders approved a merger with another company
which required the minority shareholders to sell their shares at a speci-
fied price. 5  The court held that the sole purpose of the merger was to
eliminate or freeze-out the minority shareholders.5 6 The merger was
invalidated because the directors and majority shareholders were un-
able to prove that the merger served a proper corporate purpose.
57
Therefore, the court held that the directors and majority shareholders
had breached their duty of loyalty to the minority shareholders and the
corporation.
5 8
Although the test of undivided loyalty has generally been re-
stricted to cases involving freeze-out mergers,5 9 the courts have applied
a similar test, the primary purpose test, when evaluating the directors'
actions involving the use of corporate funds in fighting a takeover.
Under the primary purpose test, the directors have been required to
prove that they acted primarily to benefit the corporation, rather than
to retain control. 60 In Bennett v. Propp,6 1 the court applied the primary
purpose test to determine whether the directors breached their duty of
loyalty to the corporation. The directors authorized the chairman's
purchase of the corporation's own stock to prevent a takeover. The
directors were confronted with a conflict of interest between the chair-
man's desire to purchase the stock and their duty of loyalty to the cor-
poration.62 The court held that, in this situation, the directors had the
burden of proving that their authorization of the chairman's stock
purchase was made for the primary purpose of benefiting the
corporation.
63
The primary purpose test was also applied in Condec Corporation
v. Lunkenheimer Company,64 where Lunkenheimer issued shares to its
own subsidiary company to prevent a takeover by Condec Corporation,
54. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
55. Id. at 972. The transaction was referred to in the case as "freezing out minority share-
holders on a cash-out basis." Id. at 979.
56. Id. at 980.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See Tender Offer Decisions, supra note 2, at 1129: "The courts have framed this very
strict standard because freezout mergers create an especially great risk of self-dealing by the cor-
porate directors and the majority shareholders."
60. See Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962); Tender Offer Decisions, supra
note 2, at 1129.
61. Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (1967).
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a minority shareholder of Lunkenheimer. The court held that the di-
rectors approved the transaction for the primary purpose of preventing
control of the company from passing to the minority shareholders.
65
Although the court cancelled the transaction,66 the court did not discuss
whether the directors had the burden of proving that their decision was
made primarily to benefit the corporation. The court based its decision
solely on evidence that showed the lack of a proper corporate purpose
resulting from the issuance of stock.
67
In Cheff v. Mathes,68 the directors purchased company stock to
prevent a takeover by a minority shareholder. The directors believed
that if the minority shareholder gained control he would either liqui-
date the company or materially alter the corporate policies. 69 The
court applied the primary purpose test7° and placed the burden of
proving a proper corporate purpose on the directors. 7' The minority
shareholder argued that the transaction was entered into for control
purposes. However, the court upheld the transaction on the basis of the
directors' proof that they acted to prevent the corporation from being
harmed.72
The Business Judgment Rule and the Hostile Tender Offer
Although the primary purpose test has been applied in some cases
involving takeovers,73 courts have generally applied the business judg-
ment rule in reviewing challenges to the directors' actions.74 Thus,
under the business judgment rule, the shareholders in a takeover case
have been required to prove that the directors acted with bad faith,
fraud or self-interest in fighting the takeover in order to shift the bur-
65. Id. at 360, 230 A.2d at 777. The transaction "was not connected with a stock option plan
or other proper corporate purpose, and . . . was obviously designed for the primary purpose of
reducing Condec's stock holdings in Lunkenheimer below a majority." Id.
66. Id.
67. The judge stated that the transaction was clearly unwarranted and so entered an order
cancelling the issuance of the stock. Id.
68. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
69. Id. at 506-07, 199 A.2d at 555-56.
70. Id.
71. The court stated that "the question then presented is whether or not defendants satisfied
the burden of proof of showing reasonable grounds to believe a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness existed by the presence of the Maremount stock ownership." Id.
72. Id. at 508, 199 A.2d at 556.
73. See, e.g., Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (1967);
Cheffv. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964); Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d
405 (1962).
74. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
658 (1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. In-
terNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
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den of proving a proper corporate purpose to the directors. 7 For ex-
ample, in Northwest Industries, Inc. v. B.F Goodrich Company,76 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ap-
plied the business judgment rule in an action for a preliminary injunc-
tion against the directors of a company. The plaintiff shareholders
sought to enjoin the directors' decision to issue stock to a third party in
order to defeat a takeover bid by a minority shareholder. Shortly after
Northwest Industries, a minority shareholder of B.F. Goodrich, an-
nounced its intention to make a tender offer for the shares of B.F.
Goodrich, the directors of B.F. Goodrich approved an agreement with
Gulf Oil Corporation to exchange the stock of the two companies. The
agreement would have blocked Northwest Industries' attempted take-
over of B.F. Goodrich. 77 In the suit against B.F. Goodrich, the North-
west Industries shareholders claimed that the stock was improperly
issued at an inflated price in order to insure that Gulf Oil would accept
the exchange agreement. However, the court held that the business
judgment rule applied to the directors' determination of the price at
which to sell their stock.78 The court presumed that the transaction was
fair and denied the motion for the preliminary injunction based on
Northwest Industries' failure to present sufficient evidence of fraud to
shift the burden of proof to the directors.
79
In a number of cases where the directors have defeated the take-
over bid, the shareholders have claimed that the directors acted out of a
desire to preserve their positions in the company.8 0 The shareholders
have argued that the directors feared that once the company was taken
over, they would lose their jobs.8' Thus a conflict arises between the
75. See notes 13-18 supra and accompanying text.
76. 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
77. Id. at 708.
78. Id. at 712. In addition to applying the business judgment rule, the court also relied on
New York Business Corporation Law § 504(a), N.Y. Bus. CORP. § 504(a) (McKinney), which
states: In the absence of fraud in the transaction, the judgment of the board or shareholders, as
the case may be, as to the value of the consideration received for shares shall be conclusive.
79. Specifically, Northwest had not presented any evidence that Goodrich's stock transaction
was fraudulent. 301 F. Supp. at 712.
80. See, e.g., Northwest Ind. Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ill. 1969). See
also Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980) (Shareholders claimed that directors'
refusal to sell shares to minority shareholders was for the purpose of maintaining control of corpo-
rate policy).
81. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 102 S. Ct. 658
(1981) wherein Judge Cudahy, in dissent, explained that "[h]ostile tender offers unavoidably cre-
ate a conflict of interest . . . . Nearly all directors and managers are interested in maintaining
their compensation and perquistes . . . . [A] hostile tender offer unavoidably involves forces
tending to shape decisions that are not necessarily for the benefit of all shareholders." Id. at 300,
n. I (quoting Gelfond and Sebastian, Reevaluating the Duties of Target Management in the Hostile
Tender Offer, 60 B.U.L. REv. 403, 435-37 (1980)) [hereinafter cited as Gelfond and Sebastian].
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corporation's interest in allowing the takeover and the directors' inter-
est in opposing the takeover in order to remain in office.82  When
presented with such a conflict of interest, the directors may reject every
takeover attempt even though the shareholders' best interests might not
be furthered by the rejection. 3 Because the business judgment rule
does not ordinarily apply when a conflict of interest exists between the
directors and the corporation, 84 the business judgment rule similarly
should not apply in the takeover setting where the potential for a con-
flict of interests is extremely high.
85
The cases, however, have not so held.86 Where the directors have
been accused of acting to maintain their control, the courts have held
the business judgment rule to be the applicable test. Thus, in order for
the shareholders to shift the burden of proof to the directors, the courts
have held that the shareholders had the burden of proving that the di-
rectors acted for the sole or primary purpose of retaining their positions
in the company.8 7 In many cases, however, the shareholders have been
unable to present evidence of a sole or primary purpose to maintain
control.88 Therefore, the cases have generally resulted in victory for the
directors.89
82. See Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d. 405, 409 (1962) wherein the court stated:
"We must bear in mind the inherent danger in the purchase of shares ... when a threat to control
is involved. The directors are of necessity confronted with a conflict of interest, and an objective
decision is difficult." Id.
83. See Tender Offer Decisions, supra note 2, at 1123: "Their [directors] own interest dictate
that takeovers be rejected, which may conflict with the interests of the shareholders which lie
primarily in the financial return on their investment."
84. See generally Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
85. Gelfond and Sebastian, supra note 76, at 437 contended that "[A] business judgment
approach in hostile tender offer cases is inappropriate." This statement has been the subject of
much dissention among commentators. See Takeover Bids, supra note 22, at 1745 wherein Profes-
sors Easterbrook and Fischel stated: "This presumption in favor of management's decision-mak-
ing has never been applied, however, in situations where managers have acute conflicts of interest
... . For this reason alone, the business judgment rule should not apply to the decision to resist
a tender offer." But see Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, An Update After One
Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Lipton] wherein the author stated: "[Tlhe
business judgment rule applies to the consideration by the board of directors of a target of an
unsolicited takeover bid." Id. at 1017.
86. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 658
(1981); Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth,
Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 999 (1981).
87. See Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 504, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964) (In applying the
primary purpose test to actions taken by directors in resisting a takeover attempt, directors were
required to show that they acted primarily to benefit the corporation rather than to retain control.
See also Tender Offer Decisions, supra note 2, at 1129.
88. See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980) (Proof that directors
issued stock to secure a merger partner that defeated a takeover was insufficient to show that the
primary purpose was to retain control).
89. See cases cited in note 86, supra.
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In Johnson v. Trueblood,90 for example, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld a verdict in favor of the directors
who allegedly acted to retain control of the corporation.9 Minority
shareholders of a financially troubled corporation offered to aid the
corporation through the purchase of additional corporate stock and the
issuance of loans to the corporation. However, the transactions also
would have caused the minority shareholders to gain control of the cor-
poration. 92 The directors refused their offers and instead, approved
transactions that were less advantageous to the corporation. Although
the shareholders argued that the desire to maintain control was a pur-
pose of the challenged action, the Third Circuit held that the share-
holders had to prove that it was the primary purpose of the directors'
actions. 93 Since the shareholders were unable to present sufficient
proof to shift the burden of proof to the directors, the court found for
the directors. Even though a motive to retain control was present, and
a conflict of interest existed, the business judgment rule was held to be
applicable to the directors' actions.
94
Similarly, in Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp.," the business judgment
rule was applied to a takeover fight between two companies. In oppos-
ing a threatened takeover of Treadway by Care, Treadway merged
with Fair Lanes, through the issuance of stock. The Second Circuit
held that the business judgment rule applied to both the directors' deci-
sion to fight the takeover and the choice of the defensive measure, in-
cluding the stock transaction. 96 As the directors were presumed to have
acted fairly in opposing the takeover, the shareholders had the burden
of proving bad faith, self-interest, or some other improper purpose.
97
Failing to meet the burden of proof, the shareholders were denied
relief.98
90. 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
91. 629 F.2d at 295.
92. Id. at 289.
93. Id. at 293.
94. The court explained that by the very nature of corporate life a director has a certain
amount of self-interest in everything he does. Id. at 294. "The business judgment rule seeks to
alleviate this problem by validating certain situations that otherwise would involve a conflict of
interest for the ordinary fiduciary." Id.
95. 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980).
96. Id. at 381. The court stated: "Once they [directors] determined that a Care takeover
would be detrimental to Treadway, it was similarly reasonable that the directors should move to
oppose it." Id.
97. Id. at 382.
98. Id. at 384. The case is an excellent example of how two courts applied the primary
purpose test and the business judgment rule to the same facts with opposite results. In Treadway,
the district court held that the primary purpose test was the appropriate standard to determine
whether the directors acted to maintain control. The court held for the shareholders. 490 F. Supp.
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Although the business judgment rule was created to free directors
from liability for good faith mistakes in business decisions, courts have
expanded its scope. Today, the business judgment rule applies to direc-
tors' judgments as to whether to accept or reject a tender offer or take-
over bid.99 Although a conflict of interest potentially exists, the
directors' actions in preventing a takeover are presumed fair.1t° Thus,
the business judgment rule also serves as a procedural device for allo-
cating the initial burden of proof to the plaintiffs. 10' The plaintiffs
must prove that the primary purpose of the directors' actions was to
retain their control over the corporation. 0 2 Otherwise, the plaintiffs
will be denied relief. This view of the business judgment rule was the
basis for the court's decision in Panter v. Marshall Field & Company.
10 3
PANTER V. MARSHALL FIELD & COMPANY
Panter v. Marshall Field & Company'0 4 involved the attempted
takeover of Marshall Field & Company by Carter Hawley Hale. In
October, 1977, Carter expressed an interest in merging with Field's.
The Field's board met and decided to reject the merger offer. They
believed that independence and internal expansion would be in the best
interests of the company. They also felt that a Field's-Carter combina-
tion would constitute a violation of antitrust laws. 0 5 In early Decem-
ber, Field's president received a letter from Carter stating their
intentions to make a tender offer.' 0 6 The directors held a special meet-
668 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). However, the Second Circuit reversed and held that the business judgment
rule should have been applied. The Second Circuit held for the directors. 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir.
1980). This supports the view that courts are confused about when to apply the two tests. See
Tender Offer Decisions, supra note 2, at 1130.
99. See cases cited in note 86 supra.
100. See text and accompanying notes 80-89 supra.
101. See text and accompanying notes 25-30 supra.
102. See text and accompanying notes 86-98 supra.
103. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 658 (1981).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 279. Field's counsel had investigated the proposed combination and stated that it
would be illegal under antitrust laws. This determination was based on the competition that
would have existed between the Field's stores and the Carter-owned Neiman-Marcus store located
in Northbrook, Illinois. It was also based on the potential competition between Field's Chicago
stores and a proposed Neiman-Marcus store which would be located one block south of the
Field's store. There was also concern over the competition between the book departments in
Field's stores and Carter-owned Walden book stores which were also located in Chicago. Id.
However, Carter's counsel did not believe there would be any antitrust problems with a Field's-
Carter combination. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1180 (N.D. 111. 1980).
Carter was even willing to sell the Neiman-Marcus store in Northbrook, Illinois, in order to elimi-
nate the overlap in the competitive area with the Field's store. Id.
106. 646 F.2d at 279. The letter stating Carter's intention to make a tender offer was made in
response to Field's directors' refusal to negotiate a merger between the two companies. Id. Prior
to the letter, Field's president had received a call from Carter's president stating Carter's intention
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ing and authorized the filing of an antitrust suit. The next day, the
directors discussed the implications of Carter's proposal and voted
unanimously to reject the proposed tender offer based on their view
that it was "illegal, inadequate, and not in the best interests of Marshall
Field & Company."
0 7
Prior to Carter's announcement of its intention to make a tender
offer, Field's held a shareholder meeting in late January to discuss two
expansion proposals. The first proposal was the opening of a store in a
Houston shopping mall which was also the location of Carter's Nei-
man-Marcus store. 0 8 The second was the acquisition of a group of five
Liberty House Stores in the Pacific Northwest. 0 9 The board approved
both expansion proposals.
On February 1, 1978, Carter announced a $42 a share tender of-
fer. 10 The next day, Field's directors began to execute the expansion
program. Shortly after learning of Field's directors' acquisitions,
Carter withdrew its proposed tender offer. Carter stated that the acqui-
sition of Field's was no longer in their shareholders' best interest be-
cause Field's expansion program created doubt as to their earning
potential."' After the announcement, the price of Field's stock
dropped to $19.112
The shareholders brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois against the directors, claiming that
the defendant directors breached their fiduciary duty."13 The share-
to make a tender offer. Field's president construed the conversation as the beginning of an un-
friendly takeover attempt. Id. During the conversation, Carter stated that it was prepared to offer
$36.00 for each share of Field's stock. Id. At the time, Field's stock was trading for $22.00.
Field's stock was trading for less than $20.00 per share in September, 1977, when Carter began
making plans for an offer. The price rose to approximately $30.00 when the letter was received.
Id. at 279-80.
107. Id. at 280.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. Carter decided to offer $42.00 after a Field's press release which indicated that $36.00
was "inadequate". Id. The market price of Field's stock had risen to $34.00.
111. Id. at 281.
112. Id. In subsequent months, Field's stock traded below $15.00. Takeover Bids, supra note
22, at 1743 n.24.
113. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. Ill. 1980). In addition to alleg-
ing violations under state law, the shareholders' suit claimed violations of §§ 10b, 14d and 14e
under Federal securities laws and rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion. Jurisdiction of the federal district court was invoked under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. Id. at 1172.
The district court dismissed the federal securities law claims because the plaintiffs did not state a
cause of action under the particular statutes. In addition, the shareholders also claimed that
Field's directors interfered with their prospective economic advantage. They argued that as a
result of the directors' actions, Carter withdrew the proposed tender offer leaving the shareholders
unable to tender their shares. The district court also dismissed this claim on the basis that the
shareholders did not allege and prove that the directors acted with the purpose of injuring their
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holders alleged that the breach occurred through the directors' adop-
tion and nondisclosure of a secret policy to resist all takeovers
regardless of benefit, the execution of defensive acquisitions, and the
filing of an antitrust suit against Carter.' 14 The district court held that
the business judgment rule was the proper standard to apply in analyz-
ing the shareholders' claims." 15 Under the business judgment rule, the
Field's directors were presumed to have acted in good faith. 16 Thus,
the shareholders had the initial burden of proving that the directors'
actions constituted fraud, bad faith, gross overreaching, or an abuse of
discretion. " 17 The district court held that the Field's directors had exer-
cised their business judgment in good faith when they decided that
Carter's proposed tender offer was "illegal, inadequate, and not in the
best interests" of Field's shareholders." 8 The district court also de-
cided that the directors' actions in filing the antitrust suit and in acquir-
ing various properties was not a violation of any fiduciary duty." 19 The
district court directed a verdict for the directors, holding that the share-
holders had not presented sufficient evidence for a jury to decide
whether the directors breached any fiduciary duty.
20
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, the shareholders argued that, instead of applying the business
judgment rule, the court should place the burden of proof on the direc-
tors in the takeover context "to establish the compelling business pur-
pose of any transaction which would have the effect of consolidating or
retaining the directors' control."' 12' The court did not agree, 22 how-
ever, and found support in the "overwhelming weight of authority" for
applying the business judgment rule to the directors' actions even when
the intent to retain control was a motive. Under the business judgment
rule, the majority held, the shareholders must overcome the presump-
tion in favor of the directors by showing that personal motivations
"predominated" in the directors actions. 23 In order to shift the burden
expectancies. The district court applied the same business judgment analysis as it did in its discus-
sion of the breach of fiduciary duty claim. See text accompanying notes 116-20 infra. As this
comment focuses on the business judgment rule in relation to the breach of fiduciary duty issue,
the securities laws and interference with expectancy claims will not be discussed further.
114. 486 F. Supp. at 1173.
115. Id. at 1194.
116. Id. at 1192.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1194-95.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1195.
121. 646 F.2d at 293-94.
122. Id. at 294.
123. Id. at 295, citing Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
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of proof to the directors, the shareholders were required to prove that
the intent to retain control was a primary motive for making the
decisions. 124
In arguing that the burden of proof should have shifted to the di-
rectors, the shareholders raised three issues. First, they claimed that
Field's maintained a secret policy of rejecting every proposed combina-
tion whether or not it was in the shareholders' best interests. The court
held that absent evidence of self-dealing, fraud, or bad faith, the direc-
tors had acted to further a rational business purpose in deciding to
maintain Field's independence. 125 The court also decided that the di-
rectors had not breached any fiduciary duty in failing to reveal the pol-
icy of independence. 1
26
Second, the shareholders contended that the expansion program
was designed to perpetuate the control of the present directors. They
argued that the acquisitions were undertaken to defeat the takeover as
it enabled Field's to appear less attractive as a takeover prospect. The
court again relied on the business judgment rule's presumption of fair-
ness and stated that the planned acquisitions were reasonable. 127 As to
the question of control, the court stated that even if the expansion pro-
gram was intended as a motive to maintain control, it was not the pri-
mary motive. 28 Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that the directors did
not violate any fiduciary duty in authorizing the acquisitions. 29
Third, the shareholders argued that the filing of an antitrust suit
against Carter constituted a breach of fiduciary duty. The court de-
cided that the directors' decision to file the antitrust suit was a proper
exercise of their business judgment. 30  A significant factor in the
court's determination was the fact that the directors sought the advice
of experienced and knowledgeable antitrust lawyers. In addition, the
court did not find any evidence of bad faith or improper motive in the
filing of the antitrust suit.'
3'
Having rejected all the shareholders' arguments, the Seventh Cir-
999 (1981). In the Johnson case, the Third Circuit decided that the directors did not act with a
primary motive to retain control in their refusal to sell stock to and accept loans from minority
shareholders. 629 F.2d at 293. See text accompanying notes 90-94 supra.
124. 646 F.2d at 297, citing Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964) (Board's
decision to purchase shares of corporation held to be primarily for a proper corporate purpose).
125. 646 F.2d at 296.
126. Id.
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cuit affirmed the district court's ruling. The court held that the share-
holders had presented insufficient evidence either to shift the burden of
proof to the directors or for a reasonable jury to find that the directors
had breached any fiduciary duty. 3
2
A strong dissent by Judge Cudahy followed the majority's opinion.
He felt that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to decide the
breach of fiduciary duty issue. 33 He disagreed with the majority's
holding that the business judgment rule was applicable to every direc-
tor's decision to resist takeover bids other than those amounting to
fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion. 34 The judge stated that in the
corporate takeover setting, the directors act to maintain control. Under
the business judgment rule, once the shareholder has proven that the
directors had an interest in the transaction, the burden of proof should
shift to the directors to prove the fairness of the transaction. 35 The
judge believed that the Field's directors were faced with a conflict of
interest so that their defensive tactics were motivated by their desire to
maintain control. Accordingly, Judge Cudahy believed that the burden
of proof should have shifted to the directors, requiring them to justify
their actions.
36
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
In analyzing the breach of fiduciary duty claims, the Seventh Cir-
cuit took a business judgment rule approach similar to that applied in
other recent takeover cases. 137 In these cases, in order for the share-
holders to sustain their burden of proof, they were required to present
evidence that the directors' actions were intended for the primary pur-
pose of retaining control. 38 In cases where the directors had author-
ized transactions solely to defeat the tender offer, courts have held that
they acted for the primary purpose of maintaining control and there-
fore breached their fiduciary duty to the corporation. 39
132. Id. at 298.
133. Id. at 299. (Cudahy, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Judge Cudahy con-
curred in the court's holdings on the securities laws issues, but dissented from the court's rulings
on the business judgment rule. As this comment focuses solely on the court's treatment of the
business judgment rule, Judge Cudahy's opinion will be termed a dissent.
134. Id. at 301.
135. Id. at 304.
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980); Treadway Co. v. Care
Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir.
1980).
138. See cases cited in note 137 supra.
139. See, e.g., Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962) (The director's purchase
PANTER V MARSHALL FIELD & CO.
For example, in Royal Industries, Inc. v. Monogram Industries,
Inc. ,140 Royal, the target company, acquired Sar Industries five days
after Monogram Industries announced its intention to make a tender
offer for Royal's shares. At the time of the acquisition, Sar Industries
had a suit pending against Monogram Industries for antitrust viola-
tions. The acquisition of Sar would have provided Royal's manage-
ment with an antitrust defense to the Monogram tender offer. 14 1 The
United States District Court for the Central District of California en-
joined Royal's acquisition of Sar and held that the "sole, primary, con-
trolling or compelling" purpose of the acquisition was to thwart the
tender offer. 142 The court also held that the directors breached their
fiduciary duty to the corporation because they manipulated the corpo-
ration to further their best interests.'
43
Contrary to the majority's construction of the facts, the Field's di-
rectors also authorized transactions that were intended to bolster their
claim that a Carter takeover would violate antitrust laws.' 44 Shortly
after the directors rejected the proposed tender offer, they approved
proposals to acquire retail operations adjacent to Carter operations.
After reviewing a list of available candidates for immediate acquisition,
the directors approved plans to acquire space in Houston and Dallas
shopping centers where Carter's Neiman-Marcus stores were lo-
cated. 145 They also authorized plans to develop a Field's store in
Northbrook Court, located in Chicago's northern suburbs, which was
also the site of a Neiman-Marcus store. In addition, the directors at-
tempted to acquire a southwestern retailer who was in direct competi-
tion with the Neiman-Marcus division. Although the later two
transactions ultimately were not consummated, 46 as the dissent cor-
of the corporation's stock primarily to prevent control from being transferred to outsiders was held
to be a breach of fiduciary duty).
140. [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,863 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
141. Id. at 91,138.
142. Id. at 91,136.
143. Id. at 91,137.
144. See 646 F.2d at 306-09 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). The concentration of Field's and Carter
stores in Chicago allegedly would have been a combination in restraint of trade and, thus, a
violation of antitrust laws. A combination in restraint of trade is an "agreement ... between two
or more persons . . . for the purpose of unduly restricting competition, monopolizing trade and
commerce in a certain commodity. . . . Such combinations are prohibited by the Sherman Anti-
trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 241 (5th ed. 1979).
145. 646 F.2d at 308 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Dallas is also the headquarters of Carter's Nei-
man-Marcus division.
146. Id. at 307. The directors' attempt to purchase the southwestern store was defeated when
the store was purchased by Dutch interests. Id. The negotiations to put a Field's store in North-
brook Court fell apart because the developer did not want another major retailer in the mall. Id.
at 308.
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rectly pointed out, they were evidence of the directors' improper inten-
tion to defeat the takeover. 147 As was the case in Royal Industries, the
Field's directors approved the transactions in order to create antitrust
obstacles to a Carter takeover. As the defensive acquisitions would
have placed Field's in an offensive litigating position in their antitrust
suit, the Seventh Circuit should have held that the directors acted for
the primary purpose of defeating the tender offer and maintaining their
control. 148
In finding that the burden of proof on the question of intent to
retain control remained with the shareholders, the Seventh Circuit re-
lied on Crouse-Hinds v. InterNorth,149 a case involving facts signifi-
cantly different than those in the Field's case. In Crouse-Hinds,
Crouse-Hinds, the target company, negotiated a merger agreement
with the Belden Company. A short time later, InterNorth proposed a
tender offer for the control of Crouse-Hinds. After Crouse-Hinds re-
jected the tender offer, InterNorth sued on the basis that the Crouse-
Hinds/Belden merger was negotiated for the purpose of defeating the
tender offer and retaining control within the Crouse-Hinds directors.
The Second Circuit, however, held that the evidence presented failed to
establish that the merger was intended solely to perpetuate the control
of the directors in the corporation.
150
In the Crouse-Hinds case, the contested merger was negotiated
prior to InterNorth's announcement of the proposed tender offer.
However, in the Field's case, the alleged improper transactions oc-
curred after the proposed tender offer was announced. Therefore, the
Second Circuit was correct in holding that the Crouse-Hinds directors'
decision to merge with Belden was not motivated by the desire to retain
control. 15 1 However, the holding in Crouse-Hinds should not have
been applicable to a situation where the Field's directors' actions were
initiated after the tender offer had been announced.152 Thus, the Sev-
enth Circuit was incorrect in relying on the Crouse-Hinds decision in
147. Id. at 306. Judge Cudahy stated that the defensive acquisitions were undertaken to "cre-
ate additional antitrust problems." Id.
148. See Takeover Bids, supra note 22, at 1748. Field's "made several defensive acquisitions
that ... aggravated a potential antitrust problem .... Id.
149. 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980).
150. Id. at 703.
151. Id. The court noted that InterNorth's good faith and lack of "interest" in entering into
the merger agreement was unchallenged. Id.
152. 646 F.2d at 302 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Within a short time after the tender offer,
Field's directors approved the acquisition of five stores in the Pacific Northwest, a $17 million
commitment for a Field's store in Texas and the institution of a major antitrust action. Id.
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holding that the directors did not act primarily to maintain control. 53
In addition, the Seventh Circuit quoted at length from Johnson v.
Trueblood'5 4 as its' authority for allocating the burden of proof under
the business judgment rule. The majority stated that, according to the
Johnson case, the shareholders had the burden of proving that the di-
rectors' sole or primary purpose for adopting a course of action was to
retain control.155 The issue arose in the Johnson case in deciding how a
jury was to be charged. 156 However, the majority in the Field's case
cited the Johnson case to decide whether there was even sufficient evi-
dence to present a jury question. The Seventh Circuit should not have
relied on a sole or primary purpose standard when determining
whether the jury should have been allowed to hear the case.15 7 As the
business judgment rule was applied in the Johnson case at a different
point in the trial, the Seventh Circuit should not have relied on the
Johnson court's use of the rule as support for its decision.
During the majority's discussion of whether the defensive acquisi-
tions were made for control or antitrust considerations, the court cited
Cherrv. Mathes1 8 as requiring proof that such a motive was the sole or
primary purpose. 159 In the Cheff case, the business judgment rule was
recognized as the appropriate standard for evaluating the corporation's
purchase or sale of its own stock. 160 When the court in Cheff reached
the question of the burden of proving the presence or lack of good
faith, the court allocated the burden to the directors to justify the trans-
action "as one primarily in the corporate interest"' 61 because the
purchase of shares involved the use of corporate funds where control of
the corporation was threatened. The court upheld the directors' actions
because they were justifiably taken to prevent the corporation from be-
ing harmed by the attempted takeover of a dissident shareholder. 162
Therefore, a closer reading of the Cheff case could have led the court in
Field's to hold that the directors had the burden of proving that the
defensive acquisitions were made primarily to benefit the corporation.
153. Id. Judge Cudahy stated that since the Crouse-Hinds/Belden merger was negotiated
prior to the proposed tender offer, "any activity to facilitate the merger... could legitimately be
ascribed to a valid business purpose." Id.
154. 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
155. 646 F.2d at 294 (quoting Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d at 292-93).
156. 629 F.2d at 292.
157. See 646 F.2d at 304 (Cudahy, J., dissenting): "Nothing in Trueblood supports the view
that the district court properly foreclosed jury consideration of the claims of Field's shareholders."
158. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
159. 646 F.2d at 297.
160. 41 Del. Ch. at 500, 199 A.2d at 554.
161. Id., citing Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. at 19, 187 A.2d at 409.
162. 41 Del. Ch. at 500, 199 A.2d at 554.
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Because a Carter takeover of Field's did not have the same potential
for harm that existed in the Cheff case, the majority should have more
closely scrutinized the directors' actions.
The Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the business judgment rule
in the Field's case placed an unreasonable burden of proof on the
shareholders to prove their claim. First, the court presumed that the
directors acted in good faith in not only rejecting the takeover but also
in upholding the defensive measures that were employed. 163 Second,
Field's hired antitrust lawyers and financial experts who provided the
directors with the appropriate justifications for their actions in fighting
the Carter takeover. 164 The majority stated that the employment of
these people was evidence that the directors exercised proper business
judgment in considering the merits of the tender offer and the defensive
measures that were subsequently undertaken. 165 When the sharehold-
ers claimed that the directors acted for the primary purpose of main-
taining control, Field's had little difficulty in attributing their business
judgment to some rational purpose. 166 The business judgment rule was
applied to allow the Field's directors virtual freedom in fighting off the
Carter takeover without considering the interests of the corporation or
its shareholders. This interpretation of the rule seems to be a far cry
from the rule that was originally intended to keep directors from being
liable for their errors in judgment. Therefore, the shareholders should
not have been required to sustain the stringent burden of proof under
the business judgment rule.
67
In applying the business judgment rule to decisions involving
tender offers, the Seventh Circuit failed to recognize the limitations of
the rule. The rule is not applicable where the directors breach their
duty of loyalty to the shareholders. 68 This occurs when a conflict of
interest exists between the directors and the shareholders. 69 In the
163. 646 F.2d at 297.
164. See id. at 299 (Cudahy, J., dissenting): "[Tlhe majority has adopted an approach which
would virtually immunize a target company's board of directors against liability to shareholders,
provided a sufficiently prestigious (and expensive) array of legal and financial talent were retained
to furnish post hoc rationales for fixed and immutable policies of resistance to takeover."
165. Id. at 297. The court stated that the reliance on antitrust counsel was sufficient to satisfy
the business judgment rule.
166. Id. The court was satisfied that a rational business purpose existed for the directors'
decision to file the antitrust suit.
167. See Cohn, supra note 3, at 477-78: "The relative ease by which management may create
a patina of legitimacy for defensive measures results in even further constriction ofjudicial relief."
168. See text accompanying notes 49-58 supra.
169. See text accompanying notes 80-85 supra. See Takeover Bids, supra note 22, at 1745:
"This presumption in favor of management's decision-making has never been applied, however,
in situations where managers have acute conflicts of interests."
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Field's case, the shareholders were offered $42 a share which repre-
sented almost a 100% premium. 70 In addition, the tender offer was
made to them in their individual capacities as shareholders.' 7' In act-
ing to defeat the takeover, the directors eliminated the shareholders'
opportunity to earn a substantial profit on their investment. 172 The di-
rectors also sought to remain in control of Field's. Thus, a conflict of
interest existed between the desires of the directors and the sharehold-
ers. In causing the defeat of the Carter tender offer and the subsequent
denial of financial profit to the shareholders, the Field's directors
breached their duty of loyalty. Hence, the protection of the business
judgment rule should not have been available.
The limitations of the business judgment rule in the takeover set-
ting have been recognized in a recent case which may indicate that
courts are shifting away from applying the business judgment rule. In
a case decided around the time of the Field's decision, the United
States District Court in Delaware applied a different standard than the
one applied by the majority in Field's. In Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp. 73
the Crane Company proposed a tender offer for the stock of the Harsco
Corporation. As some professional traders held a large number of
Harsco's stock, Harsco directors were fearful that they might tender the
stock to Crane. 174 In order to prevent this occurrence, Harsco directors
purchased a portion of the stock that was held by the professional trad-
ers. Crane sought to prevent Harsco from completing the purchase,
alleging breach of fiduciary duty.
75
In deciding whether the directors acted improperly, the court
stated that the use of corporate funds to perpetuate control was im-
proper. 176 The court also stated that when the stock purchase occurs in
the context of a tender offer, the directors have an inherent conflict of
170. See id. at 1747. Field's stock was trading in the lower $20.00 range when Carter first
announced its intentions to make a tender offer. Id. at 1743 n.24.
171. See id. at 1749 ("[M]anagement has no business decision to make when confronted with a
tender offer.").
172. See id. at 1748-49. In arguing that the business judgment rule is not applicable to take-
overs, Professors Easterbrook and Fischel wonder how shareholders are benefitted by a legal rule
that prevents them from doubling the value of their investment. They claimed that the Field's
directors' defensive tactics diminished the shareholders' welfare. They also argue that the direc-
tors' duty in responding to takeover bids is to remain completely passive. See also Easterbrook
and Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 1161 (1981).
173. 511 F. Supp. 294 (D.C. Del. 1981).
174. Id. at 297.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 305. See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 979 (Del. 1977).
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interest. 177 The court held that the burden was on the directors to jus-
tify the purchase as one primarily in the corporate interest. 78
As the burden of proof was placed on the directors, they could
have justified the transaction in two ways. First, the directors could
have shown that the transaction was made primarily for some other
reason than to retain control. 79  Second, the directors could have
shown that although the transaction was a defensive maneuver, it was
made to prevent a clear threat of harm to the business. 18 0 However, the
directors failed to meet the burden of proof as there was evidence that
the transaction was intended to retain control and prevent the shares
from being tendered to Crane.' 8 ' In addition, the court found that the
purchase was primarily intended as a defensive maneuver.'8 2  The
transaction was not justified since there was little evidence that Crane's
takeover of Harsco would have imposed a threat to the future of Har-
sco. Although the court denied injunctive relief on the basis that Crane
would not be irreparably harmed, the court held that Crane had estab-
lished a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the fiduciary
duty claim. 1
83
The Crane case is a departure from the line of reasoning that was
used to decide the Field's case.' 8 4 As in the Crane case, the Field's
directors used corporate funds to fight off the Carter takeover. 8 5 Cor-
porate funds were expended when Field's acquired the five stores in the
Pacific Northwest; committed $17 million for a Field's store in Texas;
instituted a major antitrust suit and retained expert counsel. 86 Because
Field's directors used corporate funds in the context of a hostile tender
offer, a context in which the interest in perpetuating control is acute,
then, under the reasoning of the Crane case, the directors were in a
177. Id. See Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 18, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (1962).
178. 511 F. Supp. at 305.
179. Id.
180. Id. See Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 569 (Del. Ch. 1977); accord, Cheffv. Mathes,
41 Del. Ch. 494, 506, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (1964).
181. 511 F. Supp. at 305. The court cited a statement made by Harsco's financial vice-presi-
dent taken from a deposition in which he stated that the purchase was made primarily to make the
shares not available to Crane. Id.
182. Id. at 305-06.
183. Id. at 306.
184. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 295-99 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 658 (1981).
185. It has long been established that, as a general rule, use of corporate funds to perpetuate
control of the corporation is improper unless the directors can justify the purchase as one primar-
ily in the corporate interest. See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 979 (Del. 1977)
(Corporate funds used for sole purpose of freezing out minority shareholder is a breach of direc-
tors' fiduciary duty).
186. 646 F.2d at 308 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
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conflict-of-interest situation. 87 Therefore, the Field's directors should
have had the burden of justifying the transaction. Whether the Field's
directors would have met this burden should have been a proper ques-
tion for the jury. Thus, according to the reasoning in Crane, the Field's
shareholders should not have had the burden of proving that the direc-
tors acted improperly. 188 The Crane decision raises significant doubt
whether the business judgment rule's presumption that flows to the di-
rectors should be applied in the tender offer context. As the Crane case
is the better reasoned decision, subsequent courts should rely upon it,
rather than upon the Field's decision.
CONCLUSION
In Panter v. Marshall Field & Company,189 the Seventh Circuit
held that the business judgment rule was properly applied in presuming
the good faith of directors who fight the takeover of their company. 90
Under the business judgment rule, the shareholders had the initial bur-
den of proving that the directors' actions involved fraud, bad faith,
gross overreaching or abuse of discretion. '9' However, the court failed
to recognize the conflict that existed between the shareholders' interests
in reaping the benefits of a Carter takeover and the directors' interests
in preserving their control of Marshall Field & Company. Despite a
conflict of interest, the court held that the burden of proving a proper
corporate purpose did not shift to the Field's directors since the share-
holders were unable to prove that the directors acted for the sole or
primary purpose of maintaining control. 92 As the shareholders failed
to sustain their burden of proof, the district court's grant of a directed
verdict was affirmed.
However, in discussing the business judgment rule, the court in-
correctly relied on cases that had applied the rule to significantly differ-
ent fact situations than that present in the Field's case. In addition, the
requirement of a proof of primary purpose to control placed an unrea-
sonable burden of proof on the shareholders. Thus, the court found
that the directors' decisions to expand Field's operations and to file an
antitrust suit were not made solely or primarily for control purposes
187. See 511 F. Supp. at 306.
188. See Id.
189. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981), cerl. denied, 102 S. Ct. 658 (1981).
190. Id. at 299.
191. See id.
192. Id. at 297.
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even through the acquisitions aggravated any antitrust problems associ-
ated with a Carter takeover.
The Seventh Circuit also failed to recognize that the directors
breached their duty of loyalty to the shareholders in causing the defeat
of the Carter takeover. In denying the shareholders the opportunity to
earn a substantial profit from the $42 tender offer that Carter was offer-
ing, the directors did not act in furtherance of the shareholders' best
interests. Therefore, the business judgment rule should not have been
applied. Instead, the directors should have had the burden of proving
that they acted for proper business purposes.
Finally, the Field's case should be viewed in light of a recent Dela-
ware case where, under similar facts, the burden of proof was placed on
the directors to prove that their transaction was made in the corporate
interest. Under the Crane test, the Field's directors' decisions would
not have been shielded from the presumption of fairness under the
business judgment rule and the shareholders' suit would not have been
decided for Field's directors.
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